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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 20-2437
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
VINCENT INGINO,
Appellant
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:18-cr-00379-001)
District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
_______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1
on January 22, 2021
Before: HARDIMAN and ROTH, Circuit Judges, and PRATTER,* District Judge
(Filed: March 5, 2021)
_______________
OPINION†
_____________

*

Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter, District Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
†

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does
not constitute binding precedent.

PRATTER, District Judge.
Vincent Ingino claims a violation of his Fifth Amendment rights arising from an
interview with Pennsylvania State Troopers who did not administer him Miranda
warnings. Because we find that Mr. Ingino was not in custody at the time and voluntarily
made incriminating statements, the District Court did not err in denying Mr. Ingino’s
motion to suppress. So, the Court will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Over a weekend in August 2018, Pennsylvania State Police in Stroudsburg
responded to two different emergency calls, each involving a man unresponsive due to an
apparent drug overdose. Text message records recovered from the phones of the
deceased showed recent correspondence with Vincent Ingino. At the time, Mr. Ingino
was on probation. Shortly after the overdose deaths, he failed to report for his mandatory
probation meeting. When he eventually did report to his probation officer, he tested
positive for opiates and admitted to using drugs in violation of terms of his supervised
release. His probation officer directed him to seek treatment and report back after
completing the program. When Mr. Ingino missed the deadline to report that he
completed his drug treatment program, the probation officer contacted a field unit team to
visit Mr. Ingino’s home.
Around this time, the Pennsylvania State Police investigating the overdose deaths
obtained Mr. Ingino’s address from his probation officer. One of the troopers then
accompanied the probation field unit team on the Ingino home visit. Because Mr. Ingino
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was not home at the time, the field unit team relayed to his girlfriend that Mr. Ingino was
to report to the probation office for a meeting.
Mr. Ingino reported for his mandatory probation meeting, during which he failed
his mandatory drug test. Because of the positive drug test, the probation officer told him
to expect a letter in the mail setting a court date for a revocation hearing. The probation
officer did not tell or imply to him that he would be arrested that day.
At the end of the meeting, the probation officer told Mr. Ingino that two troopers
wanted to speak to him. He responded, “Okay.” App. 77. The probation officer did not
say what the troopers wanted to talk to him about. But it soon became apparent that the
troopers were investigating the overdose deaths. The troopers met with Mr. Ingino in the
same office where Mr. Ingino had just had his probation meeting, although the probation
officer did not participate and left the room before the troopers’ questioning started. The
troopers stated that Mr. Ingino was not under arrest and that he would be walking out at
the conclusion of the session regardless of what he said. They did not raise their voices
or display their guns at any time. Although Mr. Ingino had failed his drug test earlier that
day, he was able to recall specific information connected to the troopers’ investigation.
The interrogation lasted about 30 minutes.
Mr. Ingino was charged subsequently with two counts of distribution and
possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C). He moved to suppress his statements made to the troopers because he
claimed the interrogation violated his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966). After a suppression hearing, the District Court denied Mr. Ingino’s
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motion. United States v. Ingino, 423 F. Supp. 3d 108, 110, 115 (M.D. Pa. 2019). The
court credited the testimony from the hearing, the transcript, and the recording of the
interrogation to find that Mr. Ingino voluntarily submitted to questioning in a noncustodial setting. Id. at 113–15.
Mr. Ingino proceeded to trial and was convicted on both counts. On appeal, he
again challenges that his statements were made in a custodial setting and were not
voluntarily given. We review factual findings on a motion to suppress for clear error.
United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99, 104 (3d Cir. 2005). So, we will accept those
findings unless we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Ludwikowski, 944 F.3d 123, 130 (3d Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted). We review de novo the ultimate question of whether a defendant was “in
custody” for Miranda purposes. Jacobs, 431 F.3d at 104.
II. MR. INGINO WAS NOT IN CUSTODY
Miranda protections attach to those who are “in custody.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at
467-68. “‘[C]ustody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 50809 (2012). To determine whether someone is in custody, the Court is guided by the
following factors:
(1) whether the officers told the suspect he was under arrest or free to leave;
(2) the location or physical surroundings of the interrogation; (3) the length
of the interrogation; (4) whether the officers used coercive tactics such as
hostile tones of voice, the display of weapons, or physical restraint of the
suspect’s movement; and (5) whether the suspect voluntarily submitted to
questioning.
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United States v. King, 604 F.3d 125, 138 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
Willaman, 437 F.3d 354, 359 (3d Cir. 2006)).
The classic, fact-bound considerations about the nature, setting, and duration of
the interrogation, and Mr. Ingino’s own statements show that he was not in custody at the
time he made the statements at issue.
The District Court credited the testimony from the suppression hearing, the
transcript, and the recording of the interrogation and made the following findings: (1) the
troopers spoke to Mr. Ingino only after his meeting with his probation officer ended;
(2) Mr. Ingino responded “Okay” when asked if he would speak with the troopers and
cooperated with the questioning; (3) he was aware that he was not under arrest and that
he would be “walking out” of the office that day1; (4) the interview lasted only 30
minutes; and (5) the troopers did not use overt coercion—i.e., their tone was not hostile,
they did not display weapons or physically restrain him, and the door to the office was
unlocked at all times. None of these findings is clearly erroneous.

Although the troopers did not explicitly tell Mr. Ingino he was “free to leave,”
they did not have to speak magic words for it to be clear that he was not under arrest and
was free to leave. The issue is whether the facts and circumstances would suggest to a
reasonable person in his shoes that he was not free to leave. At the start of the interview,
one trooper told Mr. Ingino that they would leave their contact information with him
following their conversation. And both troopers repeatedly reminded him that regardless
of his answers, he would be “walking out.” App. 146–47, 210. These statements suggest
the interrogation would not end with Mr. Ingino in handcuffs.
1
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On appeal, Mr. Ingino emphasizes that the troopers improperly took advantage of
his compelled presence in the probation office.2 But because the mandatory probation
meeting had ended before the troopers’ questioning, the subsequent interrogation was not
part of that mandatory meeting. The troopers were not in the probation office when
Mr. Ingino arrived or when he took the required drug test. And the probation officer
testified that the troopers’ interrogation started only after she informed Mr. Ingino that he
had violated his probation and could expect a summons—meaning that the probation
meeting had finished. Only then did the probation officer inform Mr. Ingino privately
that the troopers wanted to speak with him. While she admitted she did not tell him
whether he needed to speak with the troopers, she testified that he said “Okay” in
response and did not demonstrate any resistance to the idea of speaking with them.
Furthermore, the probation officer did not participate in the later interrogation—which
might otherwise suggest that the troopers’ questions were part of the probation meeting.
Considering the totality of the circumstances—the brief duration of the interview,
the lack of overt coercive tactics, and being told that no matter what, “you[ are] walking
out,” App. 210—the District Court did not err in holding that Mr. Ingino was not in
custody under the classic factors.
We pause briefly to consider a handful of other, less-compelling arguments that
Mr. Ingino also raises. He claims he was ambushed by the troopers into a surprise

A probation meeting alone is not custodial for Miranda purposes. Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431-33 (1984). Rather the argument is that the troopers took
advantage of the Murphy ‘exception’ to get Mr. Ingino to talk.
2
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interview. But the evidence introduced at the hearing dispels such an argument. Indeed,
he admitted in the interview that he knew the troopers were trying to reach him to discuss
one of the overdoses. So that could not have been coercive here.
Likewise, Mr. Ingino’s claim that the troopers verbally intimidated him does not
cross the line into coercion. The troopers informed him that federal prosecution would
likely yield a greater sentence than he would face in the state system, and the length of a
possible sentence was in some respects dependent on his willingness to answer the
troopers’ questions. Yet these statements were either readily obvious or already known
to Mr. Ingino, a person whose criminal history shows his familiarity with the criminaljustice system. Plus, “[i]t is appropriate for an investigator to advise a suspect of the
potential course and consequences of a criminal investigation. Suspects frequently
confront difficult decisions about whether to defend against potential criminal charges or
to pursue resolutions that may ameliorate certain unpleasant consequences.” United
States v. Czichray, 378 F.3d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 2004). In other words, discussing future
arrest and criminal penalties “is part and parcel of the interrogation process.” Id. (quoting
United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 721 (8th Cir. 2004). The statements here fit
squarely within these acceptable areas of inquiry.
Finally, Mr. Ingino’s argument that his statements were involuntary because he
was under the influence of drugs during the interview cannot carry the day. It is true that
his earlier drug test was positive and that one of the troopers said that he “didn’t look too
hot.” App. 208. But the District Court credited the testimony of the two troopers and the
probation officer who, in their respective lines of work, are familiar with the symptoms of
7

someone under the influence, and each stated that Mr. Ingino did not seem like he was
under the influence. (The troopers also testified that they were unaware during the
interview that he had failed his earlier drug test.) And the District Court found, from both
the transcript and the interrogation recording, that he was coherent, articulate, and able to
answer questions with specificity throughout the interview. Mr. Ingino raises no new
grounds to disturb these findings.
*

*

*

Even if the troopers questioned Mr. Ingino following his probation meeting
because they knew he would be present there, the mandatory probation meeting had
concluded before the troopers spoke with Mr. Ingino. Moreover, Mr. Ingino assented to
their request for an interview, which lasted only 30 minutes. And the troopers did not use
coercive tactics. Based on the duration and nature of questioning, it was objectively
reasonable for Mr. Ingino to feel free to leave. So he was not “in custody” during this
interview. The Court will thus affirm the Order of the District Court, denying the motion
to suppress.
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